A growing framework of legal and ethical requirements limit scientific and commercial evaluation of personal data. Typically, pseudonymization, encryption, or methods of distributed computing try to protect individual privacy. However, computational infrastructures still depend on human system administrators. This introduces severe security risks and has strong impact on privacy: system administrators have unlimited access to the computers that they manage including encryption keys and pseudonymization-tables. Distributed computing and data obfuscation technologies reduce but do not eliminate the risk of privacy leakage by administrators.
A growing framework of legal and ethical requirements limit scientific and commercial evaluation of personal data. Typically, pseudonymization, encryption, or methods of distributed computing try to protect individual privacy. However, computational infrastructures still depend on human system administrators. This introduces severe security risks and has strong impact on privacy: system administrators have unlimited access to the computers that they manage including encryption keys and pseudonymization-tables. Distributed computing and data obfuscation technologies reduce but do not eliminate the risk of privacy leakage by administrators.
They produce higher implementation effort and possible data quality degradation. This paper proposes the Trusted Server as an alternative approach that provides a sealed and inaccessible computational environment in a cryptographically strict sense. During operation or by direct physical access to storage media, data stored and processed inside the Trusted Server can by no means be read, manipulated or leaked, other than by brute-force. Thus, secure and privacycompliant data processing or evaluation of plain person-related data becomes possible even from multiple sources, which want their data kept mutually secret.
Introduction:

Background
Both scientific and commercial statistical evaluation of data in the fields of epidemiology, pharmacology, education or economics use person-related data containing highly sensitive private information. This comprises person-identifying data (also called person-related data like name, address, date of birth etc.), which privacy protection rules do address, as well as personrelatable information, which allow identifying a person by using re-identification techniques [1] .
Legislation [2] and ethical conventions [3] impose strict privacy protection rules not only regarding person-related but also person-relatable information. While data evaluation may be permitted by law or consent for a certain purpose [4] , it has to be ensured that any other usage of pri- 3/29 vacy-related data is effectively prevented. Other areas with growing interest in privacy protection are social networks [5] or highly security relevant networks e.g. for military use [6] .
The problem
Privacy protection in computational environments requests to protect data and computational processes from unauthorized human access. Current computational environments allow access control, data-storage and -transport protection by user-authentication and user-rights management, as well as disk-and transport-encryption. Additionally, pseudonymization permits evaluation of privacy-protected data that are readable for humans. However, none of those methods provides protection against access, infringing pseudonymization, manipulation and theft by an administrator with root-rights on involved servers. The core problem of privacy protection and data security is the need for a system administrator with unlimited rights to manage computers.
Existing solutions
Current solutions to this security and privacy core risk make use of data processing diversification over multiple computational instances and obfuscation techniques:
Double Coding Pseudonymization
A data source provides pseudonymized data, e.g. patients' clinical data with the identifying values replaced by pseudonyms. A trusted third party exchanges the 1 st level pseudonyms with new 2 nd level pseudonyms and forwards the medical data with the 2 nd level pseudonyms to the evaluating institution. The matching between 1 st and 2 nd level pseudonyms is kept secret at a trusted third party so no direct depseudonymization can be done by members of the data source and evaluating institutions neither accidentally or willingly [7] .
Differential Privacy
Adding non-destructive randomness to real data as well as random data that look like real data obfuscates datasets. Ideally, this process -optionally combined with pseudonymization -hin-4/29 ders or eliminates the identification of the person behind these data but does not affect the statistical evaluations on certain variables [8, 9] .
Secure Multiparty Computation
This method uses encrypted data exchange and complex multi-stage algorithms allowing multiple parties to commonly evaluate a function over their respective private data without giving the other parties access to these private data.
[10]
DataShield
Instead of aggregating data in one place where evaluations are performed, the underlying calculations are being sent to the data owners for in-place evaluation. Only results are returned and aggregated for further processing so no confidential private data ever leave the data owner's infrastructure.
[11]
1.4 Common disadvantages a) All methods described in section 1.3 protect data more or less against access from system administrators but share the weakness of increased effort for planning, implementation, infrastructure, administration and operation. Their complexity outgrows, as more parties will get involved.
b) Any kind of data-alteration by pseudonymization or obfuscation affects data quality. The degree of possible data degradation can be approximately quantified by applying these methods to publically available data and compare them to a direct naïve evaluation. c) Without obfuscation there is the risk of privacy leakage even from pseudonymized data with person-relatable information.
A different approach
The human factor creates disadvantages related to the methods described in section 1.3. Therefore, a generic, widely adaptable computational environment that works without any human system intervention or possible access to internal data provides the needed solution. We call 5/29 such an environment the Trusted Server (TS) and define its requirements for a practical implementation as follows:
Standards compliance
Hard-and software-components are commonly available and do not require low level customization or modification out of the ordinary.
Familiar operation
Setup, operation and usage is similar and comparably complex to administrating a conventional server with the same configuration.
Full transparency
The solution is fully transparent and does not work with secrets or obfuscation.
Unlimited verifiability
Users can review all components and the fully working system in any depth desired.
System inaccessibility
There is no system access neither during runtime nor after production.
Secure communication
The TS allows controlled submission of data and commands as well as controlled response.
Persistent encryption
The TS uses irrevocably encrypted storage which protects against external access by anyone at any time.
System verification
It is possible to verify the production system state is unaltered.
Backup strategy
It is possible to backup and restore a basic TS installation in a comfortable way. 
Implications
Any data uploaded to the TS after sealing by design are inevitably lost if the TS needs a new setup and have to be uploaded again. Depending on the data-amount this may cause serious delay requiring alternative concepts for securely delivering large data.
A working solution
Running sample applications of real world scenarios are provided on a reference implementation of the proposed TS. The TS is not just a new concept but an available stable production platform for previously impossible privacy protected data evaluation on plain unaltered personal data.
Materials and methods
Meeting the requirements
a) f) The system disk images allow restoring the system in a fast and convenient way.
LUKS based system sealing and verification
During initial operating system setup, LUKS (together with LVM) enables disk encryption. LVM is secondary to understand disk encryption and the sealing process. Therefore, we omit a thorough discussion of its role. During the installation of a new Linux system with full encryption, the system disk splits into two data partitions: partition1 one for the static boot files and partition2 for the encrypted operating system, as well as other software, and user data. In fact, there is an additional 'partition' respectively logical volume for memory-swapping as well as possible additional volumes for user data or whatever. Since those logical volumes are located within the encrypted partition2 we simply discuss the boot and encrypted partition in the following: a) After dividing the disk into two partitions, the LUKS header is written to partition2. The LUKS header consists of 8 key-slots. Each of them can store a copy of the master-key which is encrypted with a keyphrase. The keyphrase may be manually entered or automatically read from a keyfile [12] . We store the keyfile within the unencrypted boot-partition1. The master-key is used to encrypt the data area of partition2, but itself is never persistently stored anywhere (see Fig   1) .
Fig 1 Initial layout of the LUKS encrypted disk b) During the boot process, the initrd with the core operating system contents is loaded from the unencrypted partition1 and control moves to LUKS. Usually, a user submits now a keyphrase.
Instead, the TS system reads the key-file from the unencrypted partition1 and compares it with the matching keyslot-entry in the LUKS header. With the verified passphrase it decrypts the encrypted master-key and stores it in Random Access Memory (RAM). Since data in RAM are volatile on power loss, one has to redo the decryption procedure during every system boot (see Fig   2) .
Fig 2 The master-key is decrypted using the passphrase and stored in volatile memory
c) The processor transparently reads and writes from and to partition2 using the master-key as long as the master-key resides in RAM. Data on partition2 will always be encrypted; decrypted data only exist in volatile memory (see Fig 3) .
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Fig 3 Operational system state with transparent data de-and encryption
d) The sealing process starts immediately upon booting a production ready TS and erases the LUKS keyslot as well as the encrypted master-key. The master-key still resides in volatile memory and the system remains operative but the keyfile containing the keyphrase is meaningless since neither a keyslot nor an encrypted version of the master-key exists (see Fig 4) .
Fig 4 Sealed operational state
e) The master key vanishes from volatile memory If the system is rebooted or power is down (either willingly or e.g. upon theft of the server or disk). The key file still exists on the unencrypted partition1 but without the corresponding LUKS keyslot containing the encrypted masterkey. The only way to decrypt partition2 is by brute force (see Fig 5) .
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Fig 5 Inaccessible disk state after reboot or power down f) As described up to now, the sealing process prevents effectively any access to the system and storage by third parties. But, it does not yet solve the basic problem. An administrator might have a backup of the LUKS header and restore it to regain disk access. The following trick overcomes this problem: We establish a two stage setup consisting of a physical server, a virtual machine hosted on it, and two LUKS-encrypted physical disks.
g) The physical server boots from disk1 and performs the sealing. After sealing, it reencrypts the second disk using the keyfile stored in that disk's partition1. LUKS reencryption creates a new master-key that is stored encrypted with the given keyfile. While the system administrator knows that keyfile he does not know the newly generated master-key. It cannot be revealed from the already sealed physical host server either.
h) Finally the physical server starts the virtual machine which boots from disk2 and performs the self-sealing process (see Fig 6) too.
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Fig 6 The complete Trusted Server with dual stage sealing
Applications and customization
a) The system administrator implements an apache2 web server configured for https traffic that provisions the sealing logs and system verification data. If required apache2 also enables secure data input and output as well as system independent user authentication.
b) Depending on the TS's further configuration and initialization procedures, ssh access is configured and secured.
c) The TS virtual machine also provides additional services and operative user applications that are needed.
d) Following good practice for configuring a server, IPtables firewall and host access control reduce access and allowed network traffic to the required minimums.
System verification
a) When the TS is installed, full disk images of the physical host and the virtual machine are stored in a safe place.
b) Anyone can fully inspect these disk images to validate the TS installation and state.
c) Each step of the sealing process is logged. The log-files provide comprehensive status information on the host and the virtual machine disk of the sealed TS:
 The system writes SHA-512 hashes from all files on the disks and to the sealing log.
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 It lists essential configuration files in the sealing log.
 It archives configuration folders in compressed format.
d) The system publishes sealing log, system logs, and the compressed configuration archives to the (optionally access restricted) Trusted Server's website. Thus, anyone can compare the sealed state with the content of the previously disk images disclosed for verification.
Backup and restore
The disk images created from the host and virtual machine disks can also be used for fast restore of the Trusted Server's pre-sealing state in case of a configuration change or system maintenance.
Initializing production state
Simple bash-scripts perform the sealing process (section 2.2) automatically on a fully installed and purposely configured Trusted Server.
Initialization scripts reference
The following batch-scripts specify our Trusted Server implementation. They can be easily modified and customized. Their linear stepwise structure intends to provide easy readability of the sealing log. Table 2 provides scenario-independent quantitative information on the additional effort for data and privacy protection caused by a Trusted Server. Comparison is made to a conventional server operating without any data protection based on typical server-lifecycle parameters (Basic installation, Customization, Initialization and Sealing, Backup and Restore, System updates) and practical usability (System stability, Performance degradation, and Resource consumption). c) The Trusted Server provides a new state-of-the-art regarding security and protection. Table 3 gives an overview on typical operation-related security threats like leakage of foreign data or security corruption and general threats like theft, hacking and data transfer. The most relevant (but only slightly elevated) risk for the TS relates to data transfer. Basic user authentication can be implemented using apache2's file based user-and password database. After TS sealing, no change to those files is possible except by permitting securityweakening file upload.
Initialization scripts executed on TS-Host
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [13] replication offers a more transparent and flexible directory service for storing and authenticating user credentials. Apache2 can authenticate against any LDAP server instead of using its own user and password database. The system initially and regularly during operation publishes full LDAP database-dumps on the Trusted Server website. This ensures full control that OpenLDAP contains only credible users.
Thus a Trusted Server can be used with changing access permissions to the provided services without need for a new setup and sealing. While it is possible to control, that only entitled users can access a Trusted Server's web-based service, there is no control if a certain user really accesses and uses the web-service allowing for access-restricted yet anonymous online services.
Large data storage
Only after the sealing process, person-related plain data must be uploaded to the trusted server's storage. As consequence, every change or system crash requests a new data upload. To avoid long processing times for large datasets (for example when analyzing full human genomes), encrypted disks attached to the Trusted Server before sealing carry the sensitive data.
After sealing, the data provider uploads the decryption key to the Trusted Server. The disk can be newly mounted in a short time.
Intentional emergency 'backdoor'
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Specific scenarios request maximum data and privacy protection as well as an opportunity for secure controlled system access. Sending an encrypted copy of the master-key created during virtual machine disk reencryption to a trusted instance allows for secure controlled system access. Splitting the encrypted master-key into several parts enhances security and control when it's parts are sent to different third parties. Only the active cooperation of all parties allows system decryption.
Automated restore
Many professional servers provide watchdog background programs. They monitor the proper operation of the server automatically. Thus, server malfunction or unresponsiveness trigger a forced cold-reset on hardware level. The server reboots and, if configured for boot over network on disk-boot failure, automatically restores the disk images and starts the initialization scripts.
Usage examples
Privacy protected Domain Name Server
Server providing Domain Name Services (DNS) store and provide matching internet domain names and corresponding internet protocol (IP) network addresses. Whenever a user submits an internet domain name to the internet browser, a request is sent to a DNS server to provide the IP address of the corresponding server. The DNS server gets and may store the requesting users IP address and requested domain, which can be privacy sensitive information. A Trusted Server set up as an intermediate so-called DNS proxy server redirects requests to a public DNS server, providing its own network address together with the requested domain name and forwarding the returned network address to the original requesting client. Person-related clients' IP addresses are not submitted to the public DNS server.
Yao's millionaires' problem
In 1982 Andrew C. Yao introduced the Millionaires' Problem to theoretical informatics: "Two millionaires wish to know who is richer; however, they do not want to find out inadvertently any 
Use case: A standard problem in epidemiological research
The example simulates the following situation:
Data collected in three centers provide the input to a prognostic model. There is a high interest in the model but reluctance to share the data openly. The data may contain sensitive information on patient mix, treatment strategies, and respective outcomes. The TS provides an elegant solution to this problem.
Utilizing R-package plumber [16] with a problem-specific R-script allows to restrict the user to the predefined R-function calls when performing the analysis and providing the results. That assures non-disclosure of information, that should not be shared openly.
For demonstration purposes and reproducibility we take the openly available dataset GBSG from the R-package mfp [17] . The dataset consists of 686 patients and we split it into three consecutive parts of about 228 patients representing the data of three different clinics. The analysis studies the influence of age (age) and the expression of progesterone receptor (PRM).
The TS provides the results of the analysis in a list which consists of the regression coefficients c1 for the fractional polynomials of age (f1) and c2 for the fractional polynomials of prm (f2) as well as the modified cumulative baseline hazards function (CBH). Both information allow to calculate group specific survival curves: S(t|age,prm) =exp{-CBH(t)*exp*c1•f1(age)+c2•f2(prm)+.
The standard CBH is a step function with jumps at each event time.Publishing the CBH in this form may allow to reidentify individual patients by observed event times. Therefore we use a smoothed form of the CBH which blurs observed event times. This deidentifying step is given in the code line www<-lowess(haz,f=0.1). This is a very practical approach that needs more thinking in a real scenario.
In the following we two R-scripts. The first R-script (plumber.R) starts the plumber server, which is remotely accessed over the apache2 proxy. The second script (demo.R) contains the analysis which mainly rely on three functions. The function getPacman attaches the library which manages the specific library attachments needed for the analysis. The function readDat concatenates the individual csv data files in the working directory to a common data object in R. The line with the hash mark before the evalrfc function is a decorator which can be interpreted by plumber defining the call the server should respond to.
The function evalrfc provides the specific analysis data steps, returning the data that are responded, when the interface is called. After defining the functions, the script performs the following steps: attaching pacman, attaching the specific libraries over pacman and reading the data.
The evaluation is started and results are provided by calling the URL:
"https://<ipAddressOrDomainName>:<port>/evalrfc" 
Security considerations
Decryption resistance
Any grade of privacy protection and security is relative. This of course is also valid for the TS. Its grade of protection depends on the quality and irrevocability of the Virtual Machine disk2 encryption. LUKS is cryptographically strong [18] and without the key-slot keys it is impossible to decrypt the disk except by brute force -that is finding the decryption key by trial and error [19] .
Successful brute-force attacks against strong encryption are limited to a few intelligence agencies in the world, if possible at all. This in most scenarios is meaningless, since those agencies will have access to the protected data anyway.
Technical limitations
a) Server BIOS and the CPU-Microcode are closed source and potentially contain undocumented functions and backdoors. This implies that today's real-world computing hardware cannot achieve absolute trust-to-the-last.
b) The cryptographic strength of encryption techniques for Solid-State-Disks (SSD) is currently under discussion [20] . Exploiting proprietary wear leveling technology to obtain and restore a LUKS header with deleted passphrases under rare circumstances might be possible for specialists. Therefore, SSD must not be used in a Trusted Server if maximum protection even from high-26/29 ly skilled attackers is mission-critical. Using SSD with additional hardware encryption may solve the problem. This approach still needs validation.
Tamper-resistance
After testing and approval, the system administrators activate the initialization scripts. At that point the administrators could change binaries or add scripts in the physical host or Virtual Machine. This intervention could break security, for example by sending out the secret key and LUKS-header created during Virtual Machine disk reencryption.
Thorough review of the published logs and comparison of the TS' state after installation and its state after sealing are crucial. The SHA-3 hashes and log files published on the TS's website allow to detect changes and to reveal most manipulations.
For maximum trust, transparency and control, disk images should be crated immediately before the sealing is initialized and securely provided to the concerned parties. Ideally representatives of all parties personally attend the sealing and receive their disk images. Video self-surveillance of the TS and sealing process may be disclosed over the TS website, too.
Vulnerabilities
Aside from added security by sealing, a Trusted Server shares all vulnerabilities and contact surfaces with a conventional server having an identical setup. Therefore, we recommend additional security measures: a) Remove Gnome Virtual File System and any other auto-mounters for external storage to prevent code injection from scripts running automatically when an external USB storage or CD/DVD is inserted and external ports are needed for some reason. c) Disclosing a full disk image for review allows corrupting the SSL transport encryption by a man-in-the-middle attack [21] , since the private SSL key is disclosed. SSL encryption itself is not 27/29 affected, as the session encryption keys are created independently from the identifying SSL key.
However the identity of the Trusted Server needs approval by additional means.
d) A Cold-Boot [22] , DMA [23] or removable media attack on the Trusted Server is possible either. Therefore, securing the server physically is a prerequisite e.g. by gluing or soldering in RAM-modules and physically removing or destroying CD disk drives and external ports like USB.
These measures are the same as needed just to secure a conventional server with disk encryption in a given setting.
e) Additional protection and security is achieved by using a server-vault or strongroom with strict access management.
f) A physical self-destruction mechanism triggered by any human access to the server-vault may protect the TS even against the strongest attackers.
Conclusion
The TS overcomes human-centric paradigms in privacy protection concepts. All current approaches base on either trust or mistrust in single or multiple real persons. Accordingly, they establish either a network of trust, which spreads information over multiple semi-trusted instances of human-driven institutions or use complex computation schemes of fully encrypted data so nobody needs to trust anyone but himself or herself. Compared to standard non-privacyprotected solutions both approaches require highly customized workflows.
The TS may request moderately prolonged downtimes for maintenance and changes. Compared to multi stage approaches this compensates by quick and easy setup as well as minimized workflow customization.
The TS provides a conventional computational environment that grants Privacy by Design independently from any individual. Since the TS behaves -despite self-sealing and irrevocable encryption -like any standard GNU/Linux based system, it is possible to run well-established computational solutions with the highest degree of privacy.
